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1. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of several high-profile terrorist attacks in Western democracies, preventing 
violent extremism and radicalisation that lead to terrorism [VERLT] has become a priority 
of the European counter-terrorism strategy. The main objective of contemporary policies 
addressing terrorism-related threats is to facilitate transnational collaboration and elimination 
of root causes. Most national and international initiatives pursue a holistic and systematic 
approach, with participative structures. Hence, collaborative networks and practices that 
encompass the incorporation of civil society organisations and government programmes are 
seen as the most effective in countering violent extremism and radicalisation (Korn, 2016).
Among non-state stakeholders involved in prevention strategies, civil society 
organisations (CSO) are emphasised as a crucial partner on a local level, where radicalisation 
most likely occurs. Community and grass-root organisations can play a major role in preventing 
polarisation and violence and intervening into emerging conflicts. Unlike government 
employees, CSO practitioners find it easier to access even the most vulnerable environments 
and penetrate the culture and language (European Network of Deradicalisation (ENoD), 2014). 
CSOs are an integral part of local communities and aware of the problems and possible threats. 
They have direct contacts and communication with residents, can gather important information, 
provide narratives for individuals at risk and also support their social inclusion. However, 
despite the growing role of non-state actors on a political and strategic level, in practice, 
many limitations are hindering their effective work and collaboration with state agencies 
and governments. Due to inadequate regulations and coordination, absence of government 
support, and distrust between stakeholders and communities, CSOs cannot achieve their full 
potential in countering VERLT. Hence, this arena currently represents an underused resource, 
the potentials of which should be better exploited  (Gervasoni, 2017). 
Besides practical limitations, there are also research-related knowledge gaps that limit 
the understanding of the role of CSOs in countering VERLT. The analysis of research work 
related to the stakeholders’ roles and engagement in addressing the issues of fundamentalism, 
radicalisation, extremism, violence and terrorism, shows that the main body of that work 
focuses on government and state agencies, and international policies. At the same time, 
relatively low attention is given to the role of civil society actors involved in creating pathways 
to social inclusion. Hence, this is an important area requiring more in-depth investigation and 
discussion in order to inform researchers, authorities, and policymakers in their understanding 
of the stakeholders’ necessary engagement (Amath, 2015). 
In this paper, we investigate the role of civil society and communities in preventing and 
countering VERLT. By extensively reviewing literature and analysing previous research, we 
identified not only the potential contributions and capabilities of different civil society agents 
but also practical limitations hindering their effective integration into existing networks and 
circumstances impeding the progress in the establishment of a whole-of-society approach. 
The central aim of this article is to provide a clear picture of the current gaps and highlight 
the conditions that need to be addressed in the future to facilitate a comprehensive and coor-
dinated approach to countering VERLT in collaboration with non-state agents.
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2. CONTEMPORARY DIRECTIONS IN ADDRESSING RADICALISATION AND 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM
As a result of different changes and trends related to security, politics and sociodemography, 
Europe is facing an increased presence of hate crimes, radicalisation and violent extremist 
movements (European Network of Deradicalisation (ENoD), 2014; Norwegian Refugee 
Council, 2017).  What is more, the recent migrant crisis has led to the rise of right-wing 
extremists and right-wing populist forces, and that has indeed created a new challenge for 
Europe. In many states, the influx of refugees has exacerbated social polarisation and violent 
outbreaks, which indeed demands adequate intervention (Korn, 2016).
Traditionally, paramilitary units were accounted for reactions to extreme violence. 
Countering terrorism and violent extremism was based on repressive measures and was a 
designated task for security sector agencies exclusively (Pickering, McCulloch, & Wright-
Neville, 2008; Prislan, Černigoj, & Lobnikar, 2018). After years of policies and measures that 
often resulted in the opposite effect, it was recognised that the tools of “hard power” alone do 
not work and, when used outside the regulatory frames, are counterproductive and harmful 
indeed. For this reason, authorities and professionals have argued that new solutions, means 
and more of prevention-oriented approaches are necessary to efficiently combat the terrorism 
threat (De Goede & Simon, 2013).
A review of recent developments in national and international policies addressing 
terrorism-related threats shows that there are currently two general directions in the field of 
countering VERLT.
First, in the last decade, alternative paths to counter-terrorism policing that emphasise 
the significance of soft power and focus on the root causes have been acknowledged as 
more efficient means to address the threat of terrorism (Halafoff, Lam, & Bouma, 2019). 
By definition, “soft power” reflects approaches that, instead of coercion, use a mechanism 
that facilitates attraction that affects individuals and groups in a way to achieve the desired 
outcomes. Such an approach relies on the resources of culture, values, and policies (Nye, 2008). 
Namely, in the area of countering terrorism and addressing VERLT, soft power measures 
include the following activities (Berardinelli & Guglielminetti, 2018):
• disseminating awareness of the processes of violent radicalisation and recruitment;
• countering extremist narratives and propaganda, with the promotion of counter-
narratives by civil society;
• enhancing the efforts of the local communities involved, allowing to interrupt the 
process of radicalisation before an individual engages in criminal activities.
The second trend is reflected in facilitating collaborative approaches with participative 
structures and programs. Prevention strategies must address diverse factors leading to 
radicalisation and include a wide array of practitioners from governmental, local and civil 
society level, as well as consider the social and cultural characteristic of local environments 
(Prislan et al., 2018). International counter VERLT policies currently emphasise that not only 
"whole of government" but also "whole of society" efforts are necessary to identify and act 
on early warning signs of radicalisation at the micro-level. Likewise, they are also needed 
to address pre-emptively some of the enabling conditions that erode social cohesion and 
community resilience (Grossman, 2018). 
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The "frontline professionals" of the whole-of-society approach in countering VERLT 
include different state and non-state agents. Various community and non-governmental re-
presentatives are being regarded as "eyes and ears" of the society and therefore, a significant 
potential partner to the police and security agencies (De Goede & Simon, 2013). If successful, 
such a partnership between official authorities and non-state organisations can improve the 
flow of information to the police, reduce a backlash against state actions and increase the 
capacity of local communities for countering VERLT (Cherney & Hartley, 2017).
3. THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN PREVENTING RADICALISATION
In the light of research findings that there are no universal profiles and experiences of radicals 
and extremists, radicalisation is commonly understood as a fluctuating and unpredictable 
phenomena (Vermeulen & Bovenkerk, 2012). Although there are no comprehensive theories 
to explain the process of radicalisation, previous work has proven that there are two impor-
tant characteristics which need to be considered in the development of prevention strategies. 
First, the process of radicalisation into violence is of social nature. Most of the existing 
knowledge on radicalisation processes indicate that the vast majority of recruits were radi-
calised through social interaction and this has led to the recognition that the processes of 
prevention also need to be socially oriented, and account the role of social practices and ties 
(Day & Kleinmann, 2017; Gervasoni, 2017).
Second, in addressing VERLT, it is important to consider that radicalisation to violence 
primarily takes place at the local level. Therefore, locally relevant initiatives are central to 
the success of any strategy. The more communities are aware of potential threats to their 
security, the more empowered they are to be resilient against it and the better prepared they 
can be to counter the threats themselves. Hence, there are two main approaches to countering 
VERLT in the local context: community engagement and community-oriented policing. Both 
need to focus on building trust with local communities and engaging with them as partners 
to develop information-driven (i.e. evidence-based) and community-based solutions to local 
issues (Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), 2013b).
In general, the partnership narrative assumes that three main sectors need to be involved 
in urban governance and local initiatives related to countering VERLT. These include the 
public sector segment (i.e. local councils, health and social care agencies, police, etc.); the 
business segment (i.e. local companies, chambers of commerce, privatised providers of 
urban services); and the community segment (i.e. non-profit service providers, self-help 
and community action projects, citizens groups) (Dinham & Lowndes, 2008). Besides the 
public sector, the community or civil society segment (with its civil society actors, such 
as community and grass-root organisations, as well as social entrepreneurs in the form of 
non-profit NGOs) play a significant role in preventing social polarisation and violence, and 
interventions related to the detection of potentially violent behaviour (European Network of 
Deradicalisation (ENoD), 2014). 
Civil society can be defined as a system of voluntary civic and social organisations and 
institutions that form the basis of a functioning society as opposed to the structures of the state 
or the private, economic sector (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2010). It includes a diverse 
body of civil actors, communities, and formal or informal associations who engage in public 
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life, seeking to advance shared values and objectives (OSCE, 2018). The processes of societal 
self-organisation that define civil society make up a relatively autonomous public sphere, 
which can mediate social life with the state and other formal organisations. The maturity of 
civil sphere and strong traditions of civic engagement, supported by a more horizontal system 
of governing are considered vital for the success of democracy and legitimacy of the state 
and political institutions (Putnam, 1993).
Civil society actors are usually well-positioned, credible and experienced in working 
with specific groups to help identify and address the grievances that make individuals more 
vulnerable to the influence of extremist groups (OSCE, 2018). In the broadest sense, the 
primary role of civil society in countering VERLT is to facilitate and support social inclusion 
and integration of marginalised individuals into society (Choudhury, 2017; De Goede & Simon, 
2013). Social inclusion means that all members of society are able to belong and participate 
fully and are included in all aspects of a society they belong (United Nations, 2018). The 
opposite of social inclusion is social exclusion, which is a significant process in relation to 
VERLT and should be examined to develop successful inclusion policies. Social exclusion 
is, in fact, an important push-factor for radicalisation because it fuels disaffection on which 
extremist violence thrives. The process itself is diverse and related to different exclusion 
factors that lead to positions of inequality (such as social issues, deficits in the quality of life, 
poverty, unemployment, religion, race, gender, sexuality, lack of accountable governance, 
etc.) (Lister, 2000; Sajoo, 2016).
Analysing the radicalisation and recruitment process among the members of extremist 
groups in Kenya, Botha (2014) found that political socialisation also plays a significant role 
in radicalisation. It namely affects how individuals see the world around them, their self-
image, how they form their beliefs and views about the politics and religion and ultimately 
with whom they identify with. Authors define political socialisation as a process in which 
society transmits its political culture from generation to generation. This process can preserve 
traditional norms; however, if secondary socialisation agencies intervene and promote different 
values, the socialisation process can serve as a means of political and social change. Political 
socialisation can be mediated by various agencies in a society which can promote and integrate 
desired attitudinal dispositions and behaviours.  
Due to the nature of the processes of social inclusion and political socialisation, effective 
mediation and interventions mostly depend on the engagement of civil society. CSOs can 
alleviate social and political marginalisation through addressing political grievances, socio-
economic injustices, and power imbalances (Cortright, Millar, Gerber-Stellingwerf, & 
Lopez, 2012). Research conducted by Halafoff et al. (2019), for example, indicates that 
educational initiatives by CSOs can assist with addressing religious vilification, religious 
literacy, discrimination, and interreligious tensions and thereby minimise risks of alienation 
and vulnerability to extremism.
One of the main reasons why the role of CSOs is increasingly emphasised in countering 
VERLT and locally oriented initiatives is that civil society actors are seen as the agents that 
have most close day-to-day contact with people in the community. They are more likely to 
notice changes in behaviour, attitudes or orientations that may signal heightened risks or 
raise concerns. Hence, they can provide state and local authorities with valuable information 
needed to proactively address the potential threats and mitigate risks more effectively (De 
Goede & Simon, 2013; Grossman, 2018). When investigating reporting issues, concerns and 
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behaviours amongst community members and counter-terrorism practitioners, Grossman 
(2018) found that reporting about the signs of concern to authorities is the last resort. The 
vast majority of respondents suggested that they would primarily use other options, such as 
direct intervention, seeking support from other family members or friends, local community, 
religious leaders, or local service providers before going to the police.
Another important position that CSOs have in partnership narratives is also their 
potential to more effectively reach the communities with anti-extremist messages, information, 
knowledge, and morals. Belanger & Szmania (2018) investigated strategies of online 
communication by the government and non-government agents in the US and Canada and 
emphasise that both actors should work together to produce effective counter-terrorism 
messages. They found that governments are not able to comprehensively use communications 
in countering VERLT, due to legal barriers. The counter-terrorism communications should also 
reflect credibility, consider community beliefs, and avoid defensiveness of the target audience. 
In this case, non-state actors are best for providing credible communication. For this reason, 
governments need to connect and cooperate with credible individuals and communities able 
to reach the audiences that are susceptible to propaganda and appeals.
Furthermore, intervention programs that aim to pull a person or group away from 
violent extremism and change pro-violence beliefs are most effective if delivered through 
community response and community-based projects (Hirschfield, Christmann, Wilcox, 
Rogerson, & Sharratt, 2012). For this reason, CSOs are not only crucial for mitigating 
radicalisation processes but can be important in the prevention and de-radicalisation process 
as well (Gervasoni, 2017). In the area of de-radicalisation, civil society agents can provide 
diversionary services to individuals identified as being "at-risk" and most importantly 
protective and care-based interventions tailored to individuals (De Goede & Simon, 2013; 
Sarma, 2017).
As noted by Korn (2016), anti-violence or therapeutic initiatives that are unspecific 
tend to come up short as an intervention measure. Counselling and intervention are necessary 
measures when dealing with radicalised individuals; however, these support services need 
to be individually tailored and should provide adequate psychological guidance. Effective 
de-radicalisation namely depends on dialogues between extremists and de-radicalisation 
practitioners. It is about creating trust, and if a hostile atmosphere is detected, changes will 
not succeed. The relationship between the practitioner and the extremist is therefore of crucial 
importance, and that is why practitioners and agents from communities who understand 
individuals' position are best suited for establishing trust-based dialogues and atmosphere.
Another important role that CSOs also have is the protection of human rights, which 
is especially important in practising counter-terrorism laws. An independent civil society is 
one of the most promising strategies to ensure a state action that will respect human rights 
standards. CSOs, especially non-government organisations, can challenge authorities who 
reject democratic and civil activities in favour of violence (Choudhury, 2017). Historical 
experiences prove that civil society has played an important role in cases of political transitions 
from authoritarianism to democracy (Molnár, 2016). However, to promote democratic values 
and protect civil society space, a mature watchdog system and enough social capital need to 
be guaranteed (Gervasoni, 2017).
As it is evident from the review of previous research and professional recommenda-
tions, civil society has various potentials and can contribute to more effective prevention of 
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radicalisation, as well as de-radicalisation. In summary, civil society (Institute for Strategic 
Dialogue, 2010): 
1. can help to prevent radicalisation by tackling the underlying economic, social, and 
political drivers of radicalisation;
2. has a role to play in terms of narratives and messages. It can challenge the narratives 
of radicalisers and extremists and put forward positive alternatives;
3. can spot the signs of vulnerability and work upstream to protect individuals from 
radicalisation through the facilitation of improved parenting, neighbourhood 
support, and community resilience;
4. can play a role in the de-radicalisation process, with providing practical help and 
emotional support to the individuals concerned and their families;
5. has a role to play in the prevention of a planned attack by providing information 
or intelligence that could help the authorities.
The effectiveness of civic and community engagement in countering VERLT depends 
to a large extent on the maturity of the civilian system and the support it has from the state 
and local authorities. Achieving the intended impacts requires coordinated action between 
stakeholders within the system. However, the organisations and agents that make up such a 
civil society are diverse, which is why a multi-stakeholder approach needs to consider the 
potentials and abilities of all relevant actors. 
3.1. Civil society agents and their areas of work
Generally, there are three aspects of civil society involved in prevention and countering 
radicalisation and violent extremism: community groups and non-governmental organisations; 
frontline workers within state and non-state services; and the general public (Institute for 
Strategic Dialogue, 2010). According to different sources, these groups include the following 
actors (Amath, 2015; Berardinelli & Guglielminetti, 2018; Botha, 2014; Gervasoni, 2017; 
Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2010; Kozmelj, 2018; OSCE, 2018):
•  community groups & NGOs: community representatives; adult organisations; 
women's associations; culture, youth, and sports organisations; religious com-
munities and faith groups; spiritual assistants such as chaplains, imams; networks 
for religious relations and dialogue; centres for human rights and peacebuilding 
organisations; intercultural society association;
• state frontline workers and non-state services: representatives of education (schools, 
universities); researchers and academia; counsellors; sports coaches; trainers; 
mediators; local government representatives; psychologists; representatives of 
healthcare and social services; foundations for welfare and education;
• general public: families; peer groups; media and reporters; volunteers; information 
technology and social media sector; former extremists.
Among these, actors working in environments and dealing with individuals and groups 
that are of high risk (e.g. prisons, places for religious worship or training, diaspora communi-
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ties, families, educational environment and the internet) are of special importance as they are 
operating in domains where radicalisation is most likely to occur (Vermeulen & Bovenkerk, 
2012). Especially youth, women, and community leaders, including religious leaders, are seen 
as key civil society actors who can provide impactful and lasting contributions to preventing 
and countering VERLT (OSCE, 2018).
Since religiosity plays an important factor in religious extremism, faith groups and reli-
gious communities are increasingly regarded as important participants in countering VERLT 
from civil society arena. If they are socially responsible, they can provide grounds for civic 
engagement and volunteering. Faith groups are namely made up of individual citizens and 
social networks who have common religious identification or affiliation. They are constituted 
through shared beliefs, values and practices that connect people and also give them a shared 
sense of belonging, which is essential for social inclusion. They can be formal or informal, 
whereas some of them arise naturally in response to local needs, while others are government 
initiated. Faith groups are often linked to social inclusion policies as a route to minority 
communities that are harder to reach. For example, in some very deprived working-class 
communities, a professionalised voluntary organisation may be absent, and faith agents are 
the only representatives of the community (Dinham & Lowndes, 2008).
In like manner, young adults are being considered as one of the most vulnerable 
groups to radicalisation and susceptible to propaganda related to violent extremism (Global 
Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), 2013b). Therefore, youth organisations and professionals 
working with young individuals, especially in an educational environment, are also one of 
the most potentially influential partners from civil society (OSCE, 2018). By promoting 
dialogue and democratic values, youth organisations can help young adults and teenagers to 
develop social skills and competencies, and facilitate their critical thinking and attitude (Angel, 
López, & Pašić, 2017). The British Government has, for example, recognised universities as 
a key site for recruitment into violent extremist organisations and has therefore focused on 
establishing partnerships with universities and student organisations in its counter VERLT 
strategy (Choudhury, 2017).
In addition to religious communities and youth organisations, women associations are 
regarded as a significant partner, either through the promotion of common family values, 
providing social and psychological help to families or incorporating gender-based perspectives 
into countering VERLT strategies. Women's status in the field of VERLT is twofold; since they 
are a foundation of social groups and represent a central role in families, they can prevent or 
facilitate radicalisation in their family. Women's associations can participate in preventing and 
countering VERLT by building skills such as leadership and communication and providing 
education (religious and secular) and vocational training, particularly for immigrant or ethnic 
minority women (Patel & Westermann, 2018).
Following the risk-based approach, there are also other environments requiring close 
attention. The prisons are, for example, one of such risk environments, where activities related 
to the prevention of VERLT are of high significance. If a radicalised prisoner is admitted, 
de-radicalisation or intervention support is necessary, as well as measures aimed at preven-
ting radicalised prisoners from reinforcing their opinions during their detention period and/
or persuading other inmates to join in violent actions (Berardinelli & Guglielminetti, 2018). 
Likewise, diaspora communities are also potential breeding grounds for radicalisation (De 
Goede & Simon, 2013). Because of their closed and susceptible nature, the presence and 
231
Prislan, Borovec, Cajner Mraović: The Role of Civil Society and Communities… 
Polic. sigur. (Zagreb), godina 29. (2020), broj 3, str. 223 - 245
mediation of already integrated social organisations are of utter importance to facilitate cohe-
sion, prevent conflicts and enable other agents and agencies to integrate into the environment. 
The tasks performed by all these organisations and professionals vary considerably in 
terms of focus, performance, and implementation. What is more, their orientation is generally 
narrowly focused, covering specific issues. Together, CSOs can form a comprehensive support 
system for deprived individuals and environments and provide formal institutions with 
information on threats and problems from various sources.
3.2. Target groups and activities
Countering VERLT is most broadly viewed as a three-level approach, comprising of 
radicalisation prevention measures; interventions with individuals in danger of radicalisation; 
and de-radicalisation/disengagement activities. These levels differ according to target groups 
and by stakeholders involved (i.e. different professional fields). 
Prevention efforts target individuals who might be at risk of religious or political 
radicalisation at an early stage. Here, intercultural and interreligious dialogue and education to 
broaden their knowledge of democracy, human rights, and religions, is important. Intervention 
efforts target those who are very likely at risk of becoming radicalised; therefore, their 
ideological positions and radicalised behaviour should be confronted with pedagogic group 
training and one-on-one coaching that encourages self-reflection and change. Deradicalisation 
efforts, on the other hand, deal with advanced radicalisation, whereas the so-called exit 
programmes are effective for those who decide to abandon extremist beliefs. The main 
objective is to reintegrate such individuals and also to enable them to question their ideological 
interpretations and foster the detachment process (Korn, 2016).
More specifically, the main objective of countering VERLT programmes and strategies 
are people who are inclined to prejudice and discrimination, the rejection of unfamiliar norms 
and those not corresponding to their beliefs. Target groups primarily involve individuals with 
alterophobic and racist attitudes, religiously inspired fundamentalists, right-wing extremists, 
and individuals involved with mafia and cults (European Network of Deradicalisation (ENoD), 
2014).
According to OSCE (2014), diversion of "at-risk" individuals involves different forms 
of support, such as providing safe spaces, psychological counselling and mentoring, as well as 
redirecting people towards positive forms of mobilisation, which includes civic engagement, 
participation in arts and sports, etc. The main purpose of such services is to help end-users 
to develop critical thinking and self-reflection to question the violent extremist narratives 
and ideas that they may be attracted to. ENoD (2014) research among 14 European countries 
showed that most non-state organisations working in the area of countering VERLT focus on 
extreme violence. Their methodological approaches are mainly related to conflict management 
and reconciliation and include political, religious and human rights education, the development 
of social competencies and one's own identity, and intercultural and youth workshops. These 
approaches are implemented through training, coaching sessions, mentoring programmes, 
and mediation.
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There are two common ways to categorise programmes and activities performed by 
CSOs; by type (awareness building, training, strategic communications, etc.) or by function 
(prevention, intervention, and rehabilitation). However, some types of activities may fall 
under more than one functional area (OSCE, 2018). Intending to gain a more detailed insight 
into operational activities, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2010) has investigated and 
summarised the range of projects, programmes, and activities that are incorporated within 
countering VERLT across European countries.  It was found that community groups, frontline 
workers, and the general public feature heavily across all lines of activities. Respectfully, the 
following tasks and projects were identified as most common types of work and methods that 
CSOs perform or are involved in: 
• citizenship teaching and empowerment, language tuitions, promotion of leadership 
among young people, democratic platforms, campaigns on voting;
• facilitation of religious and political education, inter-faith dialogues, religious 
leaders' training;
• anti-discrimination, anti-violence, intergenerational, and myth-busting discussions 
and forums;
• development of vocational skills and communication competencies, improvements 
in school curricula;
• cohesion activities, community mapping, housing and integration policies, training, 
and employment projects;
• diversionary activities for young people (sports, arts, etc.), targeted after-school 
clubs, mentoring and role models, apprenticeships, training on the use of social 
media platforms;
• strengthening relations between institutions (the police, community and social 
services, local officials), institutional capacity building, development of information 
sharing protocols, training for frontline workers, training on spotting vulnerable 
individuals.
The maturity of these efforts in practice depends on the priority action areas determined 
in the strategic frameworks of governments. The types of approaches and programmes are 
influenced by different factors, among other things, the nature of the threats, prevalent social 
norms, political circumstances, governance structures, resources, capacities, risk assessments 
and traditions (OSCE, 2018).
In addition to the service provision for communities and their members, one of the 
important activities that non-state stakeholders operating on a local level are engaged in is 
also screening potentially relevant information and assessing the nature and extent of the risks. 
According to the P-R-A mechanism intended to enable beneficiary stakeholders to prevent, 
refer and address individuals vulnerable to VERLT, civil society agents should be included 
in the process of developing an action plan in individual cases and participate in reaching an 
agreement on monitoring the action plan for a vulnerable individual (Kozmelj, 2018). For this 
purpose, the UK government has developed the so-called Channel vulnerability assessment 
framework, primarily to help local partnerships (e.g. staff in the education and health sectors, 
local authorities, and youth services) identify individuals at risk of being targeted by terrorist 
and radicalisers. It includes factors indicating that someone might engage with a terrorist group 
or their ideology and develop the intent or capability to cause harm (HM Government, 2012). 
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Likewise, in the Netherlands, there is a government-funded project called Nuansa, which is a 
training and knowledge gathering group for frontline practitioners. The Nuansa programme 
offers a checklist to assess whether individuals are in the process of radicalisation. On this 
basis, civil society workers can be more alert and make judgments concerning interventions 
or reports. Nuansa distinguishes four categories of individuals at risks: a) ordinary resilient 
people; b) vulnerable or impressionable people; c) radicalising people; and d) actual radicals 
and extremists. The training emphasises that civil society workers should focus on and target 
the second group. What is more, the Dutch created the so-called Information houses in major 
cities that serve as centralised points and where the reports of concern to frontline professionals 
are collected, aiming to collect and register the signs of concern in early stages (De Goede 
& Simon, 2013).
Considering the broad arena in which countering VERLT takes place, as well as all 
possible stakeholders and activities, certain cases and collaborations have proved to be 
more successful and effective. Due to the current conditions and state-of-support, certain 
players are more involved in operational networks, while others still need additional impetus 
and recognition. In the following section, we first present some of the good practices and 
demonstrate the main barriers that hinder the realisation of the "whole of society" approach 
in countering VERLT.
4. GOOD PRACTICES IN JOINT COLLABORATION
The review of practical experiences of civil society service provision in countering VERLT 
shows that in many EU countries activities performed by faith-based and religious groups 
are being recognised as one of the utmost efficient diversion activities targeting individuals 
at risk. They are also regarded as the most active and engaged non-state agents in countering 
VERLT networks and activities. 
Namely, faith groups and religious communities offer an arena in which citizens of 
different backgrounds can exchange views, debate, and arrive at common positions. They are 
linked by a search for better community intelligence about extremist threats within minority 
faith communities. Moreover, they are seen as key agents in facilitating community cohesion 
and have an important role in the delivery of urban services – whether through stimulating and 
supporting social care and projects in minority communities, volunteering, or other projects 
related to education and community development (in the area of homelessness, racism, health, 
drug and alcohol abuse, skill development, culture). They also participate in urban partnership 
networks, whether on a level of strategic governance of a city, or a neighbourhood level aiming 
to tackle antisocial behaviour (Dinham & Lowndes, 2008). 
There are many different practical examples of such religiously based civil society 
engagement in countering VERLT. As an illustration, in the UK, one of the oldest Muslim 
society organisation is FOSIS, which operates as an umbrella body that represents Muslim 
students and includes Islamic student societies operating in British schools and universities. 
Activities include networking between Muslim students, charitable and humanitarian work, 
engaging in conferences and workshops, lobbying, advocating, and protesting on issues arising 
from the religious needs of Muslim students, most notably in relation to university policies that 
impact religious practices (Choudhury, 2017). In West Africa, religious and peacebuilding NGOs 
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participate in creating educational materials and conducting workshops on interfaith dialogue 
and interreligious peacebuilding. They also perform training for teachers aimed at strengthening 
their practical classroom skills and capacity to develop learner-centred pedagogical skills to 
enable critical evaluations of educational content (Abu-Nimer & Nasser, 2017).
Similarly, in Australia, MCSOs (Muslim civil society organisations) aim to provide 
the members of Muslim communities with pathways to be fully included in society, to not 
only improve their own lives but to locate legitimate ways to contribute to the community in 
which they live. Their programmes focus on four thematical issues related to social inclusion: 
supporting participation in education and training; facilitating participation in employment 
and voluntary work; connecting the community with other people and resources; and assisting 
with advocacy (Amath, 2015). 
Another practical example is a Singapore public policy that aims to regulate religious 
anxiety in multicultural and multiracial societies. The objective is to manage increased 
religiosity in hard to reach Muslim communities, their perception of being under siege, as well 
as the apprehension, fears, and misunderstandings of the general public. For this purpose, the 
state has developed a broad-based community approach in advancing inter-religious tolerance 
and promoting moderation, including the engagement of Muslim civil society agents. The 
emphasis is on organisations seeking to address the perceived exclusivism within the Muslim 
community and engage civil society in dealing with religious extremism, ignorance, and 
prejudice through inter-faith dialogue, confidence-building and the establishment of desired 
norms. The Government also formed new mechanisms for better inter-ethnic understanding. 
For this purpose, Interracial Confidence Circles were formatted, comprising of leaders of 
various racial, religious, social, educational and business groups and organisations, to build 
trust and confidence among different races and develop a mechanism to deal with racially 
or religiously related problems in communities. Those are complemented with the so-called 
Harmony circles that operate in schools, workplaces and social organisations (Tan, 2007).
Apart from these individual examples, the experiences from different European member 
states report that in recent years there has also been a progressive development of efficient joint 
collaboration projects that report on good practices connecting state and non-state stakeholders 
in countering VERLT.
For instance, the European Commission set up the Radicalisation Awareness Network 
(RAN) in 2011. The objective of RAN is to connect and bring together experts from different 
fields, namely practitioners, policymakers and academics, to support member states in 
developing their strategies to countering terrorism and radicalisation. For this purpose, teachers, 
police officers, court and prison employees, social workers, psychologists, disengagement 
practitioners, and terrorist attack victims from Europe meet regularly to share experiences 
and insights into how the growing problem of radicalisation is being combated. Furthermore, 
the goal is to transfer this shared knowledge to regional and local levels with formulating 
recommendation for decision-makers (Korn, 2016). Also, following the RAN model, a project 
entitled FIRST LINE (Practitioners Dealing with Radicalisation Issues - Awareness Raising 
and Encouraging Capacity Building in the Western Balkan Region) has been carried out by 
project partners from Central Europe and Western Balkan countries. The rationale behind the 
project is the recognition of Western Balkan countries as highly susceptible to radicalisation, 
while coordinated strategies and systemic approaches to countering VERLT and terrorism 
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are yet to be developed (Kozmelj, 2018; Prislan et al., 2018). The project aims to raise 
awareness of first-line practitioners, transfer knowledge, experiences and good practices and 
help Western Balkan partners in creating appropriate conditions for identifying main threats, 
challenges, impacts, as well as opportunities independently, and strengthening cooperation 
and capabilities of all relevant national stakeholders (i.e. police and other law enforcement 
agencies, prison and probation authorities, healthcare and education sector, NGOs, etc.). 
(Ministry of the Interior; Slovenian Police, n.d.).
A part of recognised international partnerships dealing with VERLT are also ENOD 
and EPEX networks. The European Network of Deradicalisation (ENOD) is a platform of 
practitioners from NGOs engaged in de-radicalisation and the prevention of hate crimes. 
The platform aims to connect NGOs, develop practitioners knowledge and skills, establish 
relationships with academia and policymakers, and promote the transparency of quality 
standards and methodological issues (European Network of Deradicalisation (ENoD), 2014). 
Similarly, the EPEX project (Practice exchange on de-radicalisation) aims at establishing a 
network of practitioners from European NGOs dealing with radicalisation and recruitment to 
militant Islamic extremism. The objective is to organise a cross-border knowledge, experiences, 
and lessons learned exchange as well as to enable activity-based peer-learning, connecting 
practitioners and first-liners (King Baudouin Foundation, 2019).
Another such example of a joint programme connecting different stakeholders is RecoRa 
("Recognising and Responding to Radicalisation"). This EU funded project brought together 
counter VERLT practitioners to share best practices between frontline professionals (De 
Goede & Simon, 2013). It explored the factors that restrict front line workers from proactively 
engaging in work to prevent VERLT and the approaches most likely to enable street-level 
workers to engage with government and security agencies in order to support vulnerable young 
people. Within the project, a training programme was developed and subsequently tested with 
teachers, neighbourhood police officers, youth workers, elected officials, policymakers and 
senior managers, Muslim women activists, Muslim young people, Imams and teachers in 
Islamic schools, and Muslim community activists in the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Denmark (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2010).
Even though the collaboration between state and non-state agents has improved in 
recent years and the body of good practices is growing, these cases are mainly project-based 
collaborations and the results of EU initiated and financed programs. On a strategic level, the 
role of CSOs in countering VERLT is generally recognised; however, more detailed analysis 
of the current knowledge and practitioners' reports shows that partnerships are not always 
efficient in practice. The commitments often remain on paper only, but in reality, they do 
not materialise, due to different issues and practical limitations, manly deriving from the 
inadequate mentality of leading state authorities. Research of practical experiences showed 
that in delivering their services, CSOs mostly work in partnerships with local communities, 
schools, and youth organisations, while cooperation with the institutions of political decision-
makers is not common (European Network of Deradicalisation (ENoD), 2014). 
For a partnership between all state and non-state actors to be effective, there must be a 
commitment on all sides. When either party is reluctant or unconvinced of the merits of working 
collectively, this undermines trust and willingness for cooperation. For this reason, governments 
will need to make a significant shift in thinking and practice, especially in the broad realm of 
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security, since this is an area where states are used to leading a top-down approach. Working 
collaboratively, on the other hand, requires new ways of working that are antithetical to existing 
organisational cultures, and new types of practical working arrangements related to information 
sharing and decision making (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2010).
4.1. Challenges and practical limitations
The fundamental issue that inhibits the effective work of CSOs are restrictions imposed 
by international and state measures that restrain the space of civil society. Civil society actors 
are not always provided with the necessary political and legal latitude to work effectively 
(OSCE, 2018). According to the Barcelona Declaration, in the name of fighting terrorism, 
many states adopted special legislative controls that curtail political freedoms. Restrictive 
measures make it more difficult for civil society actors to promote human rights and tolerance 
as an essential element in the prevention of VERLT (Observatory to prevent extremist violence 
(OPEV), 2017). The said was proved by research among civil society groups, donor agencies, 
research centres and governments in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America (Cortright et 
al., 2012). It found that overly restrictive counter-terrorism policies hinder the work of 
non-governmental organisations. Many of the organisations that work against VERLT are 
themselves often being labelled extremist and are facing constraints on their ability to operate. 
In many countries, regulatory measures related to the prevention of financing and support to 
terrorist groups make it more difficult for civil society actors, especially NGOs and activists, 
to operate freely and effectively. The most significant impact of such constraints is reflected in 
the acquisition of financial resources, government support and the exclusion in the decision-
making and planning processes.
Analysing the mechanisms and practice of social inclusion policy in Australian 
communities, Amath (2015) noted that despite many available pragmatic solutions on how to 
enable social inclusion, these suggestions tend to focus mainly on government responsibilities 
while neglecting the potentials of CSOs. With interviews conducted among representatives 
of civil society organisations, she found that they are proactively engaged and their work and 
efforts to be of high visibility and in-line with social inclusion policy. However, their agenda 
was not set by the government, rather it was self-motivated. She concluded that there is a 
lack of genuine recognition of the role of communities and civil society in addressing issues 
related to social exclusion.
Generally, these issues are a consequence of a too narrow top-down approach, which 
results in the depreciation of civil society and their exclusion in many counter radicalisation 
and violent extremism activities. As observed by Grossman (2018), there is little meaningful 
engagement of civil society actors at the disengagement end of the VERLT spectrum. Involving 
civil society has been conceptualised internationally as almost entirely in terms of prevention 
and early intervention. By contrast, disengagement has become institutionalised by law 
enforcement and clinical practitioners, lacking the emphasis on mobilising community-based 
resources to facilitate successful reintegration. This means that former violent extremists are 
largely denied the support and social engagement that could help re-build their sense of social 
connection, whereas communities, in turn, have been left without the resources to support 
and defend reintegration processes. 
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Stereotypic and conservative outlook on non-state actors is observable in other areas 
as well, namely in relation to specific organisations. Patel & Westermann (2018) argue that 
this is specifically the case of woman associations addressing gender differences and helping 
females who are in danger or in a position of control and power to affect individuals at risk. 
They note that women are still being treated extremely polarised and stereotypically (as either 
victims or dangerous warriors). Likewise, current initiatives emphasise women's roles in the 
prevention domain almost exclusively as mothers and wives, arguing that female maternal 
qualities provide 'unique' perspectives to spot radicalisation early. However, initiatives should 
be 'empowering', but instead, they come across as patronising, limiting the role of women to 
the domestic sphere, and neglecting the possibilities of their participation in broader public 
initiatives. As a result, caution needs to be exercised when making assumptions about the 
role of mothers (and indeed of families more generally) in countering VERLT. Families and 
their members have a powerful role to play in shaping their children's resilience and sense 
of social wellbeing. All of these stereotypes, regardless of which end of the social spectrum 
they fall on, dismiss or downplay the complexity of civil society influence and experience by 
either trivialising or romanticising their status and their impacts (Grossman, 2018).
In addition to regulatory constraints, stereotypical views and a lack of common views, 
there are also other practical limitations affecting joint collaboration and integration of civil 
society into the system of preventing and countering VERLT.
First, time and budget constraints are both often a circumstance that CSOs deal with. 
Since strategies and policies anticipate fast results, this may limit the level of time-engagement 
with civil society to superficial consultations after the drafts have been compiled. Moreover, 
filed representatives report that often neither donor patience nor funding is adequate. This is 
primarily the reason of the generally short-term nature of most funding timelines, with "CSOs 
often facing three to six-month implementation periods for work that requires a long-term 
commitment to establishing relevance (OSCE, 2018).
Second, to build social and community resilience, it is crucial to improve trust flows 
between Government and communities. However, lack of trust and confidence between 
communities, law enforcement personnel, and state institutions persists and impedes the 
resilience needed to develop meaningful, sustainable partnerships to identify and prevent 
VERLT (Grossman, 2018). Research shows that lack of trust is generally a result of two issues, 
namely distressing experiences with law enforcement and their way of imposing repression, 
as well as the unfavourable narrative of state policies and regulations.
Choudhury (2017) examined the experience of British civil society organisations and 
noted that willingness of the public to cooperate with the police in countering VERLT is 
strongly linked to the evaluation of the legitimacy of the police, especially with the perceived 
procedural justice. It is essential that the police execute their powers consistently and 
transparently, based on objective information and criteria. He argues that perceived fairness 
and equal treatment are vital for cooperation; however, in reality, this is undermined by 
the aforementioned legal restrictions and policy frameworks which generate perceptions of 
discriminatory and arbitrary state actions. The danger is that the broad discretion afforded to the 
state in the application of counter-terrorism laws has the potential for discriminatory practices. 
In the UK this, for example, has led to the situations where no suspicion stop-and-search is 
allowed, and social welfare activities and activism of Islamic societies can be interpreted as 
an indicator of radicalisation. The said is also the reason why community members and civil 
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agents face significant obstacles in coming forward to authorities. Often they do not want to 
cause trouble for community or family members. The result is often delayed reporting, beyond 
the point at which early intervention or diversion would be an option. This damages not only 
efforts to counter or prevent terrorism, but also family and civil society willingness to come 
forward in future because of the trauma they experience when things have reached crisis 
point for someone they know. What is more, many of the agencies and community groups 
that constitute strong entry-points for civil society activism are often fearful of either being 
stigmatised or of losing existing clients and funding support if they are overtly identified as 
providing intervention and support services (Grossman, 2018).
Exploring the Muslim countries' experience with reforms in the area of preventing 
VERLT, Abu-Nimer & Nasser (2017) found that not only the imposition of repression and 
criminal procedures but also top down-driven approaches lead to limited success and the 
withdrawal of civil society. By their observations, such an approach creates a resistance at 
the community level, which is often a result of fear of hidden agenda among communities, 
imposition, losing local culture or values. They found that organisations and agents outside 
of the communities are often unable to build a relationship of trust with community leaders 
and authorities because reforms failed to adapt to cultural context and work with existing 
mechanisms and local institutions. 
As observed in the previous sections, governments and state agencies are most united 
when it comes to the importance of CSOs in information gathering and heavily rely on their 
ability to integrate and provide an insight into hard-to-reach communities. Consistently, 
many projects address the methods and training of frontline practitioners, including NGOs 
and CSOs in risk assessments. However, risk identification and assessment that are expected 
from CSO agents represent yet another issue. The most concerning is the lack of knowledge 
and awareness of where to turn to for help, advice, and support when trying to "read" or 
interpret concerning behaviour or attitude changes (Grossman, 2018). Civil society workers 
must be offered knowledge frames for signalling polarisation and radicalisation, and 
toolkits for possible intervention in cases of concern. Therefore, training, workshops, and 
interactive debates through specific cases are necessary to facilitate their skills and knowledge. 
However, knowledge and experience sharing comes up short in reality (Institute for Strategic 
Dialogue, 2010). Sarma (2017) argues that lack of knowledge and experience can lead to 
poor predictions and ethically, it can lead to the labelling of an individual who is not on a 
trajectory toward violence as being "at-risk". Not only in the absence of knowledge, but in 
general, risk assessments in the context of preventing and countering VERLT are fraught with 
difficulty, primarily due to the variable nature of the phenomenon, the low base-rate problem, 
and the shortage of strong evidence on relevant risk and resilience factors. Training indeed 
has the potential to improve knowledge of the hazard and associated risks, analytic skills, 
and confidence in completing risk assessments. Nevertheless, there remains a dilemma that 
agents involved do not have any experience of, or expertise in, formal risk assessment. If 
clear information and support pathways, mechanisms and opportunities for families and civil 
society actors are not provided, then they will respond in ways that have little grounding in 
reality, which creates a series of risks for those who come forward. If we are to strengthen 
the role of CSOs in this area, then they must be constantly in close cooperation with other 
trained professionals and involved in trainings that include the latest knowledge and examples 
tailored specifically to their work situations.
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Despite a growing body of research and literature dealing with the issues that limit 
the success and involvement of civil society and community agents in countering VERLT 
strategies, there is also a different, a more negative side to their role, which must be considered 
if one is to understand the rationale and fundaments of the existing issues. In analysing the 
nature of VERLT, Molnár (2016) notes that contrary to the widely held beliefs that weak 
civil society enables the growth of illiberal politics, in some situations civil society has 
indeed provided fertile grounds to the spread of radicalism and xenophobia. His research 
deriving from the example of Hungary shows that CSOs played an important role in the right-
wing radicalisation. Conservative civic organisations have, through symbolism and public 
vocabulary, facilitated the spread of nationalism in contemporary Hungarian public life. Such 
experiences are not uncommon, especially in times when societies are facing an increased 
inflow of refugees and migrants, which is why transparency and ethical conditions must also be 
examined and considered when interpreting the issue of exclusion or stereotypisation of CSOs.
In summary, there is a wide range of challenges and dilemmas associated with civil 
society role and engagement in countering VERLT. Short-term and unstable funding horizons, 
the turnover of staff and shifting political priorities can make long-term partnerships difficult 
to achieve in practice. Moreover, the imperative for the government to take the overall 
responsibility because of its public accountability is also not encouraging. There is a need 
for a cultural shift within the security system, traditionally not accustomed to working in 
partnership, towards greater openness, information sharing, and joint decision making. There are 
also other sensitivities surrounding partnerships coming from all sides, including a reluctance 
of communities or frontline workers to stray into counter-VERLT work, resistance to this 
work coming into contact with other agendas such as cohesion and community relations, 
and a general lack of mutual trust and commitment. Beyond question, resolving these issues 
and achieving balance is difficult, especially if we consider that there are situations where 
partnerships might not be appropriate at all (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2010). In this 
perspective, the establishment of effective partnerships primarily requires adequate and clear 
policies, while actions of state authorities need to be calibrated with community organisations 
(Choudhury, 2017). Moreover, government plans for action and cooperation with civil society 
in addressing the threats to national security should not neglect the existing gaps and issues.
5. CONCLUSION
Due to realisation that repressive measures alone are not effective for the prevention of 
terrorism-related threats, more of preventative and socially oriented approaches emphasising 
the importance of a multi-stakeholder approach are being developed and implemented. As 
noted by Grossman (2018), we are entering a new phase of developing policies and models 
for dealing with extremism and radicalisation, where the involvement of civil society in 
prevention and intervention efforts, as well as disengagement and reintegration processes, 
is the next vital frontier. This paper examined the role of civil society and communities in 
countering VERLT, intending to identify relevant stakeholders and their areas of work to 
present a clear picture of the potentials and positions of non-state agents. Development of a 
comprehensive system and network of stakeholders in countering VERLT should consider 
and address current limitations. For this reason, we presented an overview of previous work 
related to the practical experiences, good practices and existing gaps limiting the progress.
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Experiences reveal that a cooperative and constructive dialogue between civil society 
and government agencies, including at the municipal level, is a prerequisite to success in 
countering VERLT. Government agencies should provide an environment that allows different 
parts of society to collaborate in the development of programs and strategies. While the 
government's role is crucial, a comprehensive VERLT strategy should involve a "whole-
of-society approach that empowers civil society," rather than an approach limited solely to 
government actors (Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), 2013a). It is also evident that 
top-down initiated strategies failed to reach desired results, which is why locally tailored 
approaches are seen as crucial. Changes must be commenced within the environmental context 
to provide higher sustainability of reforms. Interventions in the local environment can only 
be successful if they gain public acceptance; thus the context should be thoroughly examined 
and projects and organisations closely linked to community leaders and partners on a local 
level (Abu-Nimer & Nasser, 2017).
Following the recognition that radicalisation is a social process that occurs in local 
environments and closed communities, civil society and community agents have already 
been acknowledged as an essential partner in preventative and bottom-up driven initiatives. 
Nevertheless, currently, many bottom-up approaches are still self-initiated, while governments' 
commitment to cooperation frequently exists only in theory. The review and analysis of 
the civil society arena showed that it covers a wide range of possible agents working with 
individuals at risk, which can indeed facilitate their social inclusion, empowerment, conflict 
reconciliation, tolerance and promote democratic values in at-risk communities. Furthermore, 
they also proved to be a significant partner in de-radicalisation and exit programmes. In 
practice, however, their role is mostly limited to the prevention activities. 
Research and practice show that the work and participation of CSOs in anti-radicalisation 
networks is still limited and faced with many restrictions, generally arising from stereotypical 
views, and restrictive regulation, which in turn leads to a lower willingness of the communities 
and their representatives to cooperate with state professionals and law enforcement. One of 
the main concerns is related to the lack of mutual trust and confidence. To ensure effective 
joint collaboration, governments and state institutions need to build trust with communities, 
civil society agents and develop positive image among community members. Cooperation 
in counter-terrorism policing could be efficient only when communities are confident that 
legislation and policies are not implemented in a discriminatory fashion. 
The analysis of the previous work presented in this paper also showed that despite 
general obstacles and the fact that many CSOs struggle to strengthen their impact, many 
good practices do exist, and joint collaboration projects are being carried out, which implies 
that slow progress is being made. As found by Korn (2016) who investigated approaches to 
combat radicalisation and violent extremism on different levels, comprehensive prevention 
measures are common to approaches among the European states. She concludes that a system 
of shared values exists and forms the foundation for dealing with VERLT. Still, the current 
situation of agreed but non-obligatory measures and actions provided by the EU creates a 
state where countries' strategies differentiate, while a coordinated, concerted and systematic 
approach is missing.  
Consistently with these conclusions drawn, the observations from the Barcelona 
Declaration note that civil society currently represents an underused resource that needs 
adequate support and protection to make a more constructive contribution to confront VERLT 
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(Observatory to prevent extremist violence (OPEV), 2017). Most of the shortcomings described 
occur due to inadequate understanding of the potential of CSOs and traditional outlook on 
security provision. Although the impacts of community engagement are less visible as opposed 
to hard measures in responses to VERLT, it should be considered that this is one of the most 
difficult types of intervention to establish. It is dependent on strong interpersonal relationships, 
a high degree of commitment to partnership working, long-term sustainability, the involvement 
of credible actors, locally-specific responses sensitive to broader influences, and the involvement 
of well trained and confident professionals (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2010).
In order to overcome existing gaps and limitations and help facilitate locally-relevant 
approaches, the members of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) (2013b) have 
identified several good practices on community engagement in countering VERLT. First, 
community engagement and community-oriented policing must be planned as long term 
and sustained strategies, with assessment metrics put in place. Approaches need to be 
comprehensive and supported by research to understand local problems so that communities 
are not targeted for security reasons but engaged for their benefit. A holistic approach means 
that all sectors of society are engaged, and all ideologically motivated crimes countered, not 
only specific forms. Furthermore, it is necessary to establish methods to build trust in the 
community. Practitioners and officials should be honest and transparent in their efforts to 
engage the community, respect the community traditions and culture, listen to their grievances 
and conduct their work with integrity and professionalism. For developing a trust-based 
relationship, it is also crucial that engagement efforts are broad-based and inclusive of all 
members and ideologies. Communities need to be empowered to develop a counter-narrative to 
the violent extremist one and to amplify the alternative messages. Besides formal community 
leaders, also informal influencers should be included in engagement plans, as well as women 
and youth networks, former violent extremists, and victims of terrorism. From a policing 
perspective, it is advisable that a specific individual, such as a community liaison officer, be 
appointed to represent a person engaging with the community. This agent should focus on 
developing programs that build trust with the community and ensure that law enforcement 
officials are aware of any violent extremism reported in a community. 
For establishing sustaining and genuine relationships among stakeholders, the relations 
and alliances need to be clearly defined. According to OSCE recommendations (2014), inter-
agency coordination can be facilitated and effective only if there is a clear division of the 
areas of responsibility and accountability among all agencies. For this, mutual awareness 
of the distinct roles and competencies must be established, as well as the transparency and 
oversight of inter-agency coordination arrangements. Moreover, protocols for a lawful and 
human rights-compliant sharing of information, especially confidential information, need to 
be put in place and clear decision-making procedures on joint action defined.
All stakeholders involved in joint collaboration, especially state authorities, need to 
recognise the potentials and role of CSOs, their ability to access even the most vulnerable 
environments and build relationships based on respect. It is not enough that such recognition 
exists only in documented form; it needs to be accomplished through changed mentality, 
working practices, and adequate support. It is important to consider that to fulfil their tasks, 
civil society agents need adequate support in the form of professionalisation, exchange of good 
practice, and a more stable relationship with governmental bodies, so that their knowledge, 
skills, and services can be systematically maintained, further developed and mainstreamed 
into ongoing work (European Network of Deradicalisation (ENoD), 2014).
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To conclude, the future success of the civil society and community members' engagement 
in countering VERLT will mostly depend on governments and security organisations and 
their readiness to change their positions and how they work, as well as to take into account 
the proposals of non-state actors and respond to their needs. The said will only be done when 
all agencies and stakeholders involved do realise that imposing a response to radicalisation 
or extremism based on security measures reflects unsuccess. As noted by Gervasoni (2017), 
using hard security measures means there has been a failure in dealing with factors leading 
to extremism and violence. 
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Sažetak  ___________________________________________________________________________
Kaja Prislan, Krunoslav Borovec, Irena Cajner Mraović
Uloga civilnog društva i zajednica u suzbijanju nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije
Aktualne politike i inicijative usmjerene na suzbijanje radikalizacije i nasilnog ekstremizma potiču 
sustavan međuresorni pristup koji uključuje i organizacije civilnoga društva. Unatoč generalnom pre-
poznavanju različitih uloga i potencijala civilnog društva u području prevencije i deradikalizacije, u 
praksi je ipak puno izazova i neznanja što dovodi do toga da civilno društvo ostaje neiskorišteni resurs. 
U ovome radu prezentiramo potencijale i sposobnosti civilnog društva i njegovih organizacija i zajed-
nica u suzbijanju nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije. Kroz ekstenzivni pregled literature istražujemo 
dobre prakse u kolaboracijama, kao i ograničenja koja ometaju razvoj holističkog pristupa i angažmana 
cijelog društva u suzbijanju nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije. Glavni je cilj ovoga rada pružiti 
jasnu sliku aktualnih propusta i uputiti na probleme koji se moraju rješavati kako bi u perspektivi bilo 
moguće postići sveobuhvatan i koordiniran pristup u suzbijanju nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije.
Ključne riječi: radikalizacija, nasilni ekstremizam, prevencija, međuresorni pristup, organizacije civil-
nog društva, zajednica.
